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this study examines to what extent extrinsic and intrin-
sic work values are associated with nonelectoral politi-
cal participation, such as signing a petition and taking 
part in a public demonstration. We examine whether 
individualism and economic factors at the country level 
moderate the relation between work values and politi-
cal participation. using data from two rounds of the 
european Social Survey covering thirty-one countries 
(N = 55,927), results show that people who are extrin-
sically motivated are less politically active, while people 
who are intrinsically motivated are more politically 
active. Comparatively low national wealth weakens 
these relations. Findings also reveal that people who 
highly value extrinsic job rewards are even less politi-
cally active in individualist countries, whereas people 
who highly value intrinsic job aspects are more politi-
cally engaged in those countries. Overall, this study 
adds to understanding who is politically active and 
under which conditions.
Keywords: extrinsic; individualism; intrinsic; political 
participation; work values
Contemporary societies face major  challenges, such as aging populations, mass migration, 
climate change, and severe  economic crises. 
Governments and politicians are expected to 
deal with such problems, thereby acquiring 
legitimation for their role in democratic political 
systems (Dahl 1971). Citizens may express dis-
satisfaction with how governments deal with 
major social problems through conventional or 
electoral political participation. radical ideolo-
gies and parties have, for instance, gained sup-
port in many countries (rooduijn  et  al. 2017; 
Visser  et  al. 2014). Citizens may also consider 
unconventional or nonelectoral ways to take 
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political action. One can think of joining the Occupy movement, signing a petition 
against the bio-industry, or taking part in mass demonstrations against global warm-
ing. these kinds of political protest are often viewed as a reaction to the (perceived) 
inaction or inadequate response of governments (barnes and kaase 1979). 
Connecting citizens to the state by political participation and civic involvement, 
however, is considered crucial for a vibrant and well-functioning democracy 
(Putnam 1993). As Van Deth (2014, 350) puts it, “participation is the elixir of life 
for democracy.”
In this contribution, we examine citizens’ nonelectoral political participation 
and its relation to work values. Specifically, we are interested in the associations 
between extrinsic work values (e.g., valuing job security or a high income) and 
intrinsic work values (e.g., valuing a job that enables the use of own initiative) and 
political participation. Prior studies on the influence of work values predomi-
nantly focused on consequences for work-related outcomes, such as job aspira-
tions (Gallie, Felstead, and Green 2012), job mobility (Gesthuizen and Dagevos 
2008), and job satisfaction (kalleberg 1977). At the same time, previous studies 
on political participation have not considered work values as a predictor (e.g., 
brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Dalton 2008; Linssen  et  al. 2014; Norris, 
Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Verba, Nie, and 
kim 1977). We argue that people’s work values reflect socialization processes and 
outcomes related to working under specific conditions (see also the contribution 
by Gallie, this volume). Looking at features of a person’s job or work place to 
explain involvement in nonelectoral political action may thus add to our under-
standing of the complex interplay between motives and resources that are deci-
sive for who becomes politically engaged. Moreover, the work domain seems 
especially important as jobs and work contracts are increasingly precarious as a 
result of globalization and labor market flexibilization, which are guided by politi-
cal processes (kalleberg 2009). this could be conducive to people taking political 
action. empirical evidence suggests that workplaces act as “pools” rather than 
“schools” of democracy (Ayala 2000; Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009), yet 
work values have not been closely scrutinized.
the relation between work values and political participation has also not 
been examined comparatively. to deal with the variety in economic and politi-
cal constellations in which work values could be relevant for people’s political 
participation, we propose a cross-national approach. More specifically, we 
expect that cultural (i.e., individualism) and structural country characteristics 
(i.e., wealth, unemployment, and income inequality) may strengthen or weaken 
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the relation between work values and political participation. hence, we formu-
late the following research questions: (1) to what extent are people’s extrinsic 
and intrinsic work values associated with nonelectoral political participation, 
and (2) to what extent are these relations moderated by a country’s level of 
individualism and by macroeconomic conditions? We employ data from two 
rounds of the european Social Survey (eSS), gathered in 2004 and 2010. the 
eSS is a high-quality survey that is particularly suitable for the purpose of our 
study, because it includes valid measurements of both work values and none-
lectoral political participation. by this, we mean that the sample size is large 
and covers a broad and diverse population within countries, and the survey 
questions have been tested in a way that ensures they actually measure what 
they intend to measure. to answer our research questions, we conduct multi-
level regression analysis on a sample of more than 55,000 individuals across 
thirty-one countries.
theoretical Framework and hypotheses
Much research has been done on unconventional political participation (Inglehart 
1997; Norris 2002; Opp 2009; theocharis and Van Deth 2017). We will not dis-
cuss all possible theoretical explanations for individual differences in nonelec-
toral participation but focus on the unique contribution of people’s work values 
and rigorously control for confounding explanations in our analysis. Furthermore, 
we theoretically elaborate on factors at the country level that possibly moderate 
the relation between work values and political participation.
Work values and political participation
People’s sociopolitical ideologies and values seem more important than self-
interest in determining whether they are politically active (Inglehart 1997). 
researchers generally acknowledge that such values are the result of socialization 
processes (Grusec and hastings 2014). People’s work values are established along 
the life course, and several socializing agents play a role in this process (Gallie 
2007; kalleberg and Marsden 2013). First, growing up with higher-educated and 
well-to-do parents likely nurtures values of autonomy and self-expression (pri-
mary socialization). Second, a person’s own schooling (secondary socialization) 
supports the development of more liberal work attitudes (hyman and Wright 
1979). Most importantly for this study, we expect work place characteristics to 
affect the way people feel about their work. the work domain can thus also be 
seen as a socializing agent through which people internalize work values (e.g., 
Gallie, this volume). thus, one could say, this tertiary socialization process con-
tributes to the formation of political opinions, which in turn may affect political 
participation. this seems especially relevant because the work domain is impor-
tant in politics—wage systems, company regulations, and labor market laws are 
directly affected by political decision-making.
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In general, involvement in associations is theoretically thought of as training 
for democracy (Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). being active in nonpolitical 
organizations would have a positive effect on political participation as people 
obtain the civic skills, mindset, and social network needed to participate politi-
cally. these capabilities and competencies can be directly acquired in the work-
place and transferred to the political domain (brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; 
Schur 2003). this spillover hypothesis assumes that work offers opportunities to 
learn how to participate in politics and to develop an ideological position that is 
required for political participation (Sobel 1993). however, Ayala (2000) demon-
strated that civic skills learned in voluntary, nonpolitical associations are more 
decisive for a person’s level of political participation than skills learned in invol-
untary or at least less voluntary settings such as that of the workplace. What is 
more, studies thereafter have shown that the commonly found relation between 
active involvement in voluntary associations and political participation is likely 
due to a selection effect instead of a socialization effect, implying that individual 
resources and personality traits stimulate both civic and political engagement 
(Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009; Van Ingen and Van der Meer 2016).
Although the supposed participation-enhancing effect of the workplace has 
been examined, we know of no studies that have looked specifically at work val-
ues. two distinct but related dimensions are often distinguished regarding atti-
tudes toward work. extrinsic work values are largely driven by monetary 
incentives, such as a high income, bonuses, or fringe benefits. Jobs are thus 
mostly valued for their material rewards (Gallie 2007). Intrinsic work values 
stress the importance of job autonomy and personal development (ester, braun, 
and Vinken 2006). It then seems most important for people to make use of their 
talents and capabilities (Gallie 2007). It is important to acknowledge that none-
lectoral political participation, such as taking part in demonstrations or working 
in a political party or action group, is occasionally considered as individualized 
collective action or responsibility-taking (Stolle and Micheletti 2013). We expect 
that people who put more emphasis on intrinsic work values and who highly value 
a job that enables them to take initiative would be more prone to take political 
action as a way to contribute to the common good. People who subscribe more 
to extrinsic work values and appreciate monetary benefits would be considered 
more self-centered and therefore less prone to collective action. People with high 
extrinsic work values may also refrain from taking political action because they 
are afraid of losing their job when they do so or because they might fear their 
employer’s reaction if it becomes known that they are politically engaged. the 
fear of losing material job rewards thus hampers political participation, particu-
larly among extrinsically motivated people. this leads to the following individual-
level hypotheses: (h1) The higher people value extrinsic job rewards, the less 
they participate in nonelectoral political activities; and (h2) The higher people 
value intrinsic job rewards, the more they participate in nonelectoral political 
activities. to test these hypotheses, we rigorously control for individual charac-
teristics and resources, human values, political interest, and social origin with the 
aim of ruling out selection effects.
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The role of individualism and macroeconomic conditions
Next to individual-level expectations, we argue that both cultural and struc-
tural country characteristics may influence the association between work values 
and political participation. research on unconventional political participation has 
scarcely examined such cross-level interaction effects and did not do so for work 
values (Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon 2010; rapp and Ackermann 2016; Welzel 
and Deutsch 2012). We first derive hypotheses about the moderating role of 
individualism.
based on the seminal work of Inglehart (1997), we expect that people are 
affected by the cultural makeup of a country. hofstede, hofstede, and Minkov 
(2010) differentiate national cultures according to their collectivist and individu-
alist nature. In collectivist countries, individuals are stimulated to regard personal 
goals as subordinate to collective ones. by contrast, people are less bound to col-
lective norms in individualist countries, where they mostly take care of them-
selves and more often pursue their own interests. With respect to nonelectoral 
political participation, we expect that valuing extrinsic work rewards has stronger 
consequences for taking political action in more individualist countries. In such 
environments, less attention is paid to the creation of collective goods. As a con-
sequence, people who mainly value extrinsic job rewards will be supported in 
their self-centered attitude and will refrain even more from politically participat-
ing for a greater good. People who hold intrinsic work attitudes, with generally 
more attention given to collective goods, might also be affected by individualism 
in society. In those societies, where the breeding ground for collective action is 
weak and opposition toward it might be stronger, it could be more difficult to 
organize collective action. People who highly value intrinsic job aspects are thus 
also expected to be less prone to take part in political activities due to the attenu-
ating influence of individualism. We hypothesize: (h3) The more individualized 
a country, (a) the stronger the negative relation between extrinsic work values 
and participation in nonelectoral political activities and (b) the weaker the posi­
tive relation between intrinsic work values and participation in nonelectoral 
political activities.
We also expect structural macroeconomic conditions to affect the relation 
between work values and political action. earlier studies showed that macroeco-
nomic conditions affect support for extrinsic and intrinsic work values (Gallie 
2007; Gesthuizen and Verbakel 2011). research has also shown that people are 
less politically active in countries with greater income inequality (Dubrow, 
Slomczynski, and tomescu-Dubrow 2008). however, comparative research that 
examines how the association between work values and political participation is 
affected by macroeconomic conditions is lacking.
Our expectation is that adverse macroeconomic circumstances stimulate 
people with high extrinsic work values to take part in nonelectoral political 
activities. under these conditions, especially extrinsic aspects of work and 
acquiring a good income are threatened. For extrinsically motived citizens, 
poor economic circumstances might be a motive to engage in political activism 
to advance their point of view and to act upon labor market insecurity, which 
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might hit them personally. As we expect to find a negative relation between 
extrinsic work values and political participation, this relation will likely be less 
negative (weaker) in countries with worse macroeconomic conditions. For peo-
ple with high intrinsic work values, we predict the opposite. We expect them to 
be less politically active in countries that perform worse economically. In situ-
ations of economic hardship, expressing intrinsic work values will likely be less 
important, and simply having sufficient financial means may prevail. even 
people who highly value intrinsic job rewards might be worried about losing 
their job and making ends meet. therefore, they are more often forced to 
refrain from action to protect collective goods. this leads to our final hypoth-
eses: (h4) The poorer the economic performance of a country, (a) the weaker 
the negative relation between extrinsic work values and participation in non­
electoral political activities, and (b) the weaker the positive relation between 
intrinsic work values and participation in nonelectoral political activities. 
Figure 1 graphically summarizes our theoretical and analytical framework. 
Dashed arrows reflect nonhypothesized effects.
Methods
Data
We use data from rounds two and five of the eSS, collected in 2004 and 2010. 
the target population consisted of persons aged 15 and older who live in private 
households. respondents are selected for face-to-face interviews based on strict 
random probability sampling. response rates for round two range from 44 per-
cent in France to 79 percent in estonia. For round five, response rates vary 
between 30 percent in Germany and 77 percent in bulgaria.1
We pooled the data from both rounds. the initial sample was made up of 
99,995 respondents. We selected adults age 18 to 64, as 65 was the state pension 
age in most european countries at the time. this means that we excluded 
FIGure 1
Theoretical and Analytical Framework
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retirees. the main reason for doing so is that retired people are likely a selective 
group with regard to work values. We also removed first-generation migrants 
because they are a selective group as well, especially regarding political participa-
tion. these selections reduced the sample to 61,680 respondents.2 Finally, we 
removed respondents with missing values. the analytical sample comprises 
55,927 individuals across thirty-one countries.3
Nonelectoral political participation
Individual nonelectoral political participation refers to people who partici-
pate voluntarily with the objective of influencing political decisions (Van Deth 
2014). unlike for politicians, the political activities citizens undertake are not 
part of their job. the question was asked as follows: “there are different ways 
of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going 
wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?” 
respondents had to answer whether they (1) contacted a politician, govern-
ment, or local government official; (2) worked in a political party or action 
group; (3) worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker; (4) signed a petition; 
and (5) took part in a lawful public demonstration.4 A confirmatory factor analy-
sis (enforcing a single-factor structure) of the total sample of countries con-
firmed that these items measure one underlying construct. the factor accounts 
for nearly 38 percent of the total variance. Confirmatory factor analyses for 
each country separately also support unidimensionality with explained vari-
ances ranging from 30 percent in Finland to 47 percent in turkey. the depend-
ent variable is constructed by the sum score of the five dichotomous items, 
which is a common operationalization in the literature (e.g., Ayala 2000; Van 
Ingen and Van der Meer 2016). On average, respondents score 0.572 on the 
political participation scale, which ranges from participating in none of the 
activities to participating in all five. there are substantial cross-national differ-
ences. Average political participation is lowest in hungary (0.207) and Portugal 
(0.220) and highest in Iceland (1.464) and Norway (1.100).
Work values
Work values are measured by the following question: “how important do you 
think each of the following would be if you were choosing a job?” respondents 
could answer on a scale ranging from 0 (not important at all) to 4 (very impor­
tant). the items “a secure job” and “a high income” were averaged to measure 
extrinsic work values. the Pearson correlation between both items is .465 (p < 
.001). Intrinsic work values are measured by a single item: “a job that enables you 
to use your own initiative.” the correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic work 
values across all countries is .244 (p < .001), which is in line with previous cross-
national studies that reported a positive association (e.g., Gesthuizen and 
Verbakel 2011). the relation is strongest in turkey (.589, p < .001) and weakest 
in Norway (.029, p = .183).
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Country­level variables
We added five variables at the country level. First, we included a measure of 
individualism, which is one of six dimensions to compare the cultures of countries 
in hofstede’s 6D model (hofstede, hofstede, and Minkov 2010). According to 
this model, individualism is the degree of interdependence among members of a 
society. In highly individualist countries, people predominantly look after them-
selves and their direct family. In contrast, in highly collectivist countries, people 
also take care of others. Second, we added three variables to capture macroeco-
nomic conditions: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment 
rates, and Gini coefficients. Figures on GDP were derived from the World bank 
to measure the level of national wealth. We logged this variable to minimize the 
impact of countries with high GDP. unemployment rates are taken from the 
online database of the united Nations economic Commission for europe 
(uNeCe). Gini coefficients are obtained from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID), ensuring comparability across time and space 
(Solt 2016). Finally, we included a control variable indicating whether a country 
has been known to be an authoritarian regime since 1945.5 the highest correla-
tion at the country level (between authoritarian regime and GDP) is –.762 (p < 
.001), which does not directly indicate multicollinearity.
Control variables
based on previous research (e.g., Opp 2009; theocharis and Van Deth 2017), 
we controlled for a battery of relevant variables to deal with alternative explana-
tions of work values and political participation and to take into account composi-
tional differences between countries. We control for an individual’s openness to 
change (a higher-order group of basic human values) and universalism, as devel-
oped by Schwartz (1992). We also control for the extent to which people are 
politically interested. educational attainment of respondents and their parents 
refers to the highest level of education completed based on the International 
Standard Classification of education (ISCeD). For parental educational level, 
we also included a dummy variable for missing values. Occupational status of 
respondents and their parents is measured by the International Socio-economic 
Index of occupational status (ISeI), which ranges from 16 to 90 (Ganzeboom, De 
Graaf, and treiman 1992). We also added dummy variables for respondents who 
are unemployed, students, and inactive; and a dummy variable for missing values 
on parental occupational status. Finally, we included age, gender, marital status, 
and number of children living in the household. table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics of all variables.
Analysis
We applied multilevel linear regression analysis to take into account that indi-
viduals are nested within countries.6 We first estimated a random intercept 
model without covariates to calculate the intraclass correlation (M0). In the next 
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tAbLe 1
Descriptive Statistics (N1 = 55,927; N2 = 31)
Min. Max. Mean SD
Political participation 0 5 0.572 0.936
extrinsic work values 0 4 3.207 0.694
Intrinsic work values 0 4 3.007 0.879
Political interest 0 3 1.343 0.880
Openness to change 0 5 3.166 0.884
universalism 0 5 3.772 0.779
educational level
 ISCeD 1–2 0 1 0.230  
 ISCeD 3–4 0 1 0.478  
 ISCeD 5–6 0 1 0.292  
Parental educational level
 ISCeD 1–2 0 1 0.407  
 ISCeD 3–4 0 1 0.351  
 ISCeD 5–6 0 1 0.198  
 Missing 0 1 0.044  
Occupational status
 ISeI 16–34 0 1 0.233  
 ISeI 35–55 0 1 0.271  
 ISeI 56–90 0 1 0.165  
 unemployed 0 1 0.118  
 Student 0 1 0.091  
 Inactive 0 1 0.122  
Parental occupational status
 ISeI 16–34 0 1 0.405  
 ISeI 35–55 0 1 0.316  
 ISeI 56–90 0 1 0.209  
 Missing 0 1 0.071  
Age category
 18–34 years 0 1 0.369  
 35–54 years 0 1 0.479  
 55–64 years 0 1 0.152  
Male 0 1 0.467  
Marital status
 Married/cohabiting 0 1 0.516  
 Divorced 0 1 0.100  
 Widowed 0 1 0.023  
 Single 0 1 0.337  
 Missing 0 1 0.024  
Number of children in household 0 14 0.865 1.095
eSS round 5 0 1 0.527  
Individualism 25.0 89.0 56.000 17.818
GDP per capita (logged) 8.8 11.2 10.190 0.488
unemployment rate 4.0 16.5 8.965 3.390
Income inequality (Gini) 24.2 42.8 29.765 4.878
Authoritarian legacy 0 1 0.520  
SOurCe: european Social Survey (2004 and 2010).
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model (M1), we added all variables in table 1 to test h1 and h2. We also con-
trolled for eSS round in this model and onward. In the following model (not 
shown), we allowed the effects of the work values to vary across countries. the 
random slope variance components are significant, meaning that the effects of 
extrinsic and intrinsic work values vary cross-nationally and that country charac-
teristics should be able to explain this variation. to this end, we ran four models 
(M2–M5) that test h3 and h4. Interval variables are centered on their mean 
value in all models.
results
the results of the multivariate analysis are shown in tables 2 (M1) and 3 (M2–
M5) and present unstandardized coefficients. based on the null model, the intra-
class correlation is (.087/[.087 + 0.809=]) .097. this means that almost one-tenth 
of the total variance in political participation is situated at the country level. the 
country-level variance is also highly significant (p < .001), confirming that mul-
tilevel analysis is appropriate.
Model 1 shows that extrinsic and intrinsic work values are both significantly 
associated with political participation, controlled for individual and country char-
acteristics. the higher people value extrinsic job aspects, the less they participate 
politically. the results show the opposite for intrinsic work values. the higher 
people value intrinsic job aspects, the more they participate politically. We find 
these relations over and above the influence of a wide range of potential con-
founders, strengthening our confidence that we are able to avoid selection 
effects. If extrinsic work values increases with its range, political participation 
decreases by .240 (4 × –.060); and if intrinsic work values increases with its 
range, political participation increases by .152 (4 × .038). these findings support 
h1 and h2.
We briefly pay attention to the effects of the control variables. As can be seen 
in table 2, people who are more interested in politics, more open to change, and 
more universalist in nature are more politically active. the same holds true for 
higher-educated people and those who have higher occupational status as they 
are politically more active than their counterparts. Similar effects are found for 
parental educational level and occupational status. We also observe that students, 
people aged 35 to 54 years, and divorced people exhibit more political behavior. 
Men take less political action than do women. At the country level, GDP per 
capita is positively and marginally significantly related to political participation. 
All in all, the variables in Model 1 account for 10 percent of the individual-level 
and 61 percent of the country-level variance.
table 3 contains the results with regard to the cross-level interactions. the 
main effects of extrinsic and intrinsic work values apply to countries with average 
levels of individualism (M2), wealth (M3), unemployment (M4), and income 
inequality (M5). Starting with individualism, we find support for h3a: the more 
individualized a country, the stronger the negative association between extrinsic 
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tAbLe 2
Linear Multilevel Regression Analysis of Political Participation
M1
extrinsic work values –.060***
Intrinsic work values .038***
Political interest .251***
Openness to change .047***
universalism .054***
educational level
 ISCeD 1–2 ref.
 ISCeD 3–4 .052***
 ISCeD 5–6 .163***
Parental educational level
 ISCeD 1–2 ref.
 ISCeD 3–4 .024*
 ISCeD 5–6 .063***
Occupational status
 ISeI 16–34 ref.
 ISeI 35–55 .033**
 ISeI 56–90 .073***
 unemployed .019
 Student .102***
 Inactive –.024†
Parental occupational status
 ISeI 16–34 ref.
 ISeI 35–55 .012
 ISeI 56–90 .029*
Age category
 18–34 years ref.
 35–54 years .020*
 55–64 years .005
Male –.016*
Marital status
 Married/cohabiting ref.
 Divorced .055***
 Widowed –.008
 Single .016
Number of children in household .019***
eSS round 5 –.033***
Individualism –.003
GDP per capita (logged) .219†
unemployment rate .016
Income inequality (Gini) –.012
Authoritarian legacy –.203
Intercept .555***
Individual-level variance .728***
Country-level variance .034***
SOurCe: european Social Survey (2004 and 2010).
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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work values and political participation (–.052 – .001). the positive relation 
between intrinsic work values and political participation also becomes stronger if 
individualism increases (.035 + .001), which rejects h3b.
Moving on to the macroeconomic variables, the results with regard to GDP 
per capita are clear and in accordance with h4a and h4b. the lower a country’s 
GDP per capita, the weaker the negative effect of extrinsic work values (–.054 + 
.038) and the weaker the positive effect of intrinsic work values on political par-
ticipation (.038 – .060). unemployment does not moderate the effects of extrinsic 
and intrinsic work values, which refutes h4a and h4b for this macroeconomic 
indicator. Last, and in support of h4b, the higher the level of income inequality, 
the weaker the relation between intrinsic work values and political participation 
(.036 – .004).
We present predicted scores on political participation across the range of 
extrinsic and intrinsic work values as well as the range of individualism and the 
macroeconomic factors in Figure 2. the figure sheds light on the strength of the 
cross-level interaction effects. First, note that the direct effect of GDP on politi-
cal participation is visible in Figure 2 as the two lines are farthest apart, regard-
less of looking at the minimum or maximum scores on work values. GDP also 
seems to play the strongest moderating role, particularly in affecting the effect of 
intrinsic work values given that the lines are strongly diverging. Finally, unem-
ployment and income inequality seem to be of the least importance, especially 
with regard to extrinsic work values because the lines run virtually parallel or 
slightly diverge.
tAbLe 3
Random Slopes Work Values and Cross-Level Interaction Effects
M2 M3  
Intercept .519*** Intercept .518***
extrinsic work values –.052*** extrinsic work values –.054***
extrinsic × Individualism –.001* extrinsic × GDP per capita (logged) –.038*
Intrinsic work values .035*** Intrinsic work values .038***
Intrinsic × Individualism .001** Intrinsic × GDP per capita (logged) .060***
M4 M5  
Intercept .521*** Intercept .522***
extrinsic work values –.054*** extrinsic work values –.053***
extrinsic × unemployment rate .003 extrinsic × Income inequality (Gini) .000
Intrinsic work values .036*** Intrinsic work values .036***
Intrinsic × unemployment rate –.004 Intrinsic × Income inequality (Gini) –.004*
SOurCe: european Social Survey (2004 and 2010).
NOte: Models are controlled for all variables in table 2.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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FIGure 2
Predicted Scores on Political Participation (Y-Axis) for Minimum and Maximum Scores 
on Work Values (X-Axis) and Minimum and Maximum Scores on Country Characteristics
NOte: the moderated effects of extrinsic work values are shown on the left, those of intrinsic 
work values on the right. the top panel displays the moderating effect of individualism, while 
the panels below represent the moderating effects of GDP per capita, unemployment, and 
income inequality.
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Conclusion and Discussion
Citizens exert influence over government policies by taking political action. this 
study assessed the relation between people’s extrinsic and intrinsic work values 
and their nonelectoral political participation—activities such as signing petitions, 
contacting a (local) government official, or taking part in a public demonstration. 
We took a cross-national approach and assessed whether the effects of both types 
of work values are moderated by cultural and structural country characteristics, 
using data from two rounds (2004 and 2010) of the methodologically rigorous 
eSS.
Starting with the first research question, the results clearly showed that people 
who highly value extrinsic job rewards are less prone to take part in political 
activities, whereas people who hold more intrinsic job attitudes are more politi-
cally active. We argued that these associations likely reflect socialization pro-
cesses in the workplace that either hamper or promote one’s inclination to 
contribute to the common good. On one hand, individuals with extrinsic work 
values have been subject to socializing forces that emphasize self-interest, attach 
less importance to collective goals, and do not foster the development of skills 
useful for taking political action. On the other hand, individuals who find intrinsic 
aspects of work important have been socialized at work in “intrinsic” environ-
ments. Personal development, autonomy, and the common good are generally 
held to be important in those environments, which may subsequently translate 
into increasing political action. People who are intrinsically motivated may also 
be more motivated to use their acquired civic skills to politically participate (e.g., 
Schur 2003).
Our findings are inconsistent with previous studies that show that the work-
place does not seem to matter as much (Ayala 2000) and that voluntary associa-
tions do not socialize people to be politically active, but bring politically active 
people together (Van der Meer and Van Ingen 2009; Van Ingen and Van der 
Meer 2016). Although these studies did not examine work values and although 
our cross-sectional research design cannot completely rule out selection effects, 
we took into account a wide range of factors that are related to both work values 
and political participation. by doing this, we found robust associations between 
work values and political activity.
both nonelectoral political participation rates and their relation to work values 
differ considerably across countries, rendering our cross-national approach plau-
sible. building on works by Inglehart (1997) and hofstede, hofstede, and 
Minkov (2010), we expected individualist national cultures—as opposed to col-
lectivist ones—to weaken the effect of extrinsic and intrinsic work values. Indeed, 
individuals primarily concerned with extrinsic work values are even less likely to 
take political action in individualist countries, suggesting that such a cultural 
makeup supports a self-centered work attitude.
Contrary to our expectations, individuals who value intrinsic job factors show 
more political involvement in individualist countries than in collectivist countries. 
this finding perhaps implies that in individualist countries the necessity to take 
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political action is felt stronger because the breeding ground to solve collective 
problems is less well developed. this might stimulate individuals who recognize 
the greater good to achieve change through unconventional political 
participation.
In accordance with our expectations, findings revealed that in countries with 
lower GDP per capita, people who have extrinsic work values take more political 
action, whereas people who hold intrinsic work attitudes are politically less 
active. GDP was also the only economic factor that directly affected political 
participation rates. For extrinsically motivated people, the role of lower national 
wealth can be understood in terms of self-interest: (the fear of) being hit by an 
economic downturn might motivate them to act. For intrinsically motivated peo-
ple, (the fear of) economic decline might result in a lower prioritization of taking 
collective action. this could be the case because poor economic performance of 
a country might mean that taking political action is directed at personal, material 
goals, coinciding less with their values and more with the values of extrinsically 
motivated individuals. the empirical evidence with regard to the moderating role 
of unemployment and income inequality was less univocal.
For our cross-national comparison, the eSS rounds of 2004 and 2010 provided 
high-quality and tailored data: sufficient countries, valid measures—the items 
pertaining to extrinsic and intrinsic work values, and their intercorrelations, 
nicely fit into previous work on these dimensions (Gesthuizen and Verbakel 2011; 
kalleberg 1977)—and ample opportunity to control for confounding factors. this 
enabled us to advance current knowledge as we demonstrated the relation 
between work values and nonelectoral political participation, as well as the mod-
erating role of cultural and structural characteristics of european countries. 
Future comparative research could benefit from multiple-item measurements of 
extrinsic and, in particular, intrinsic work values; and from extending the scope to 
other work dimensions, such as values related to workload and preferred supervi-
sion style. It would also be interesting to examine whether the politic climate of 
countries affects the association between work values and political participation. 
Finally, taking a longitudinal perspective would provide the opportunity to more 
adequately deal with possible selection effects and reciprocal causal relations and 
may get a grip on what precisely is driving the effect of work values on political 
participation (Van Ingen and Van der Meer 2016). For example, under which 
conditions do work values change from extrinsic to intrinsic and vice versa, and 
to what extent does that influence (un)conventional political participation?
to conclude, this study underlines the importance of collective action, as do 
many other studies (e.g., Putnam 2000). An intrinsic (work) motivation favors 
autonomy, own initiative, and personal development over material rewards; and 
socially flourishing (work) places over “bowling alone.” unconventional political 
participation exemplifies the willingness to take action to contribute to the col-
lective good and to invest time and effort in achieving collective gains. Our find-
ings showed that a person’s intrinsic work motivation is strongly associated with 
taking collective action. What is more, people with a stronger self-centered work 
motivation contribute more to the collective good when cultural values and 
norms regard personal goals as subordinate to collective ones. Intrinsically 
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motivated individuals also seem to feel a stronger need to take political action in 
individualist countries. As ever more empirical evidence underscores that cohe-
sive and inclusive societies are better protected from collective ills (Fukuyama 
1995; Putnam 2000), governments face the challenge to nourish and stimulate 
collective awareness and the collective good.
Notes
1. More detailed information about the eSS is available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
2. We performed a robustness analysis on employed people only. the results regarding our hypotheses 
do not change.
3. the list of countries is Austria, belgium, bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech republic, Denmark, 
estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
turkey, ukraine, and the united kingdom.
4. two additional items—“worked in another organization or association” and “boycotted certain 
 products”—were excluded from the political participation scale. by looking at face validity, these items are 
not strictly political. Nevertheless, the findings with regard to our hypotheses are not substantially different 
when we include these items.
5. Although our interest lies in the moderating effect of cultural and structural country characteristics, 
we tested if an authoritarian legacy moderates the relation between work values and political participation. 
results show that the negative effect of extrinsic work values and the positive effect of intrinsic work values 
are weaker in countries with a history of authoritarianism.
6. More than 60 percent of all respondents do not participate politically at all. because of this skewed 
distribution, we considered multilevel Poisson regression analysis. the results of this alternative analysis 
are similar to the effects in model 1 of table 2. unfortunately, a model with a random slope for either 
extrinsic or intrinsic work values is unable to converge.
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